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Abstract 
This article is intended to show why borderless firms should be distinguished from traditional born global firms (BGs). 
Borderless firms have an internationally dispersed configuration of downstream, upstream and support value-added activities, 
an entrepreneurial team not bounded by a home base, and multinational founders, management teams and/or a multinational 
workforce. The concept of borderless firms emerged from analysis of empirical evidence and is intended to countervail the 
excessive focus of BGs literature on downstream activities. Drawing from five case studies, we found that borderless firms 
may be the result of ex-ante planning. However, most often, the internationally dispersed configuration of value chain activities 
seems to emerge from effectuation approaches, stemming from networking, including unexpected interactions, which may be 
envisaged as instruments to overcome constraints or to explore new business opportunities. The article shows that borderless 
firms present features which differentiate them from traditional BGs. Implications for entrepreneurs and researchers are 
provided in the concluding section. 
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1 Introduction 
The process of firm internationalisation has 
undergone significant changes in the last 25 
years. While there are still companies that follow 
a gradual process of international expansion, a 
new breed of firms has adopted a fast-outward 
strategy, expanding internationally since (or 
almost since) inception. They have been called 
different names, international new ventures 
(INVs) and born globals (BGs) being the most 
common (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Knight & 
Liesch, 2015). A BG was defined as a “company 
that has achieved a foreign sales volume of at 
least 25% within three years of its inception and 
that seeks to derive significant competitive 
advantage from the use or resources and the sales 
of outputs in multiple countries” (Andersson & 
Wictor, 2003:254).  
                                                          
1Corresponding author: vcs@iseg.ulisboa.pt 
However, following the path of Kuivalainen, 
Sundqvist and Servais (2007) and Mathews and 
Zander (2007), other researchers have argued 
that the concept of BGs has focused downstream, 
granting insufficient attention to international 
sourcing activities (Simões, da Rocha, Mello & 
Carneiro, 2015; da Rocha, Simões, Mello & 
Carneiro, 2017). This downstream approach to 
BGs has led, according to these authors, to the 
implicit assumption that BGs were established in 
a home base, that provided the foundation for 
international expansion (Kuemmerle, 2005). 
Simões and others (2015) argued that an 
increasing number of INVs show a configuration 
that defies the home base logic, exhibiting an 
internationally dispersed value chain (almost) 
since inception. These firms are what we call 
Borderless. According to da Rocha and others 
(2017:124), a “borderless firm presents the 
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following characteristics (or a combination of 
them): (i) value-added activities dispersed across 
different countries and regions from the 
beginning (or shortly thereafter); (ii) 
entrepreneurs not bounded by a home base; (iii) 
multinational founders and/or management 
teams; and (iv) a multinational workforce”. 
This article draws upon this research stream 
to elaborate further on the differences between 
Borderless firms and traditional BGs. 
2 Borderless firms and traditional BGs 
The pioneering research on INVs and BGs 
envisaged these firms as profiting from 
internationally dispersed activities either 
downstream (sales) or upstream (sourcing). This 
is clear in Oviatt & McDougall (1994:49)’s path-
breaking article on INVs, which argued that these 
firms derived “significant competitive advantage 
from the use of resources and the sale of outputs 
in multiple countries”; a similar perspective was 
provided by Jolly, Alahuta, and Jeannet (1992). 
Oviatt and McDougall (1995:35) suggest that in 
these firms entrepreneurs “loosen the ties that 
bind their business thinking to a single country or 
culture”. However, extant literature has step-by-
step focused just on marketing and sales, leaving 
sourcing aside. Increasingly, BGs have been 
characterised on the basis of international market 
scope, assuming (albeit implicitly) that most, if 
not all, upstream activities are located in a single 
(the home) country. As da Rocha and others 
(2017:426) remark, Jones and others (2011) 
literature review of international 
entrepreneurship (and BGs) research mentions 
only 2 (out of 323) studies that escape the foreign 
market sales focus. 
A relevant example of this perspective is 
provided by Kuemmerle’s (2005) “zone of 
balanced expansion”. While recognizing the 
existence of an increasing number of companies 
located on different countries from inception, 
Kuemmerle (2005) argues that using a single 
home base increases the odds of new firms’ 
success, reducing internationalisation risks.  
The borderless argument has different 
concerns. Mainly drawing on case studies, it has 
focused on understanding how a borderless 
configuration emerges and develops (Simões and 
others, 2015) and on “why and how have certain 
new ventures developed early on an international 
configuration of value system activities across 
several countries and regions of the world” (da 
Rocha and others, 2017:124). More recently, 
Simões and Martins (2017) have contrasted 
borderless with traditional BGs in terms of the 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial team, 
network relationships, and value chain 
configuration. 
The borderless literature has also shown that 
while the setting up of a dispersed international 
value chain (almost) since inception may be the 
result of design and planning, it often stems from 
an effectuation approach (Sarasvathy, 2008). To 
explore emergent opportunities or to overcome 
perceived constraints, the entrepreneurial team 
develops cooperative linkages with other 
individuals and organisations (da Rocha and 
others, 2017; Simões & Martins, 2017). The case 
studies analysed by da Rocha and others (2017) 
provide interesting illustrations of these aspects. 
3 Case Studies 
Leblon Cachaça was established in 2005 by 
Steve Luttman, an American with extensive 
experience in the beverage industry. He felt that 
cachaça, a Brazilian spirit distilled from 
sugarcane, might be successful in the US market. 
In the process, he met Gilles Merlet, a French 
cognac distiller, and Merlet agreed to further 
develop the product. As the relationship evolved, 
Merlet took a stake in the company, and the 
firm’s cachaça started being aged in oak barrels 
in France. The company acquired estates and a 
distillery in Brazil, from where cachaça is sent to 
France in containers, and then shipped to 
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distributers in around 20 countries. The main 
market is still the US.  
RacingThePlanet was launched by Mary 
Gadams (a former executive of multinational 
companies) in 2002 in Hong Kong. After a 
diversified executive international experience, 
this marathon runner was “brewing in her head” 
the idea of starting a company in charge of 
organizing marathons in exotic places. When she 
created the firm, she had already fully developed 
a successful business model to keep costs low, 
using volunteer staff and her friends and 
acquaintances’ network. The company later 
established an office in the UK to coordinate the 
flow of supplies to and from different countries. 
The services provided required a complex 
coordination of people—staff, volunteers, 
contractors, participants, etc.—spread all over 
the world. RacingThePlanet had 45 full-time 
staff located in Hong Kong and the UK, more 
than 100 volunteers, and representatives in 
Germany, Italy, and Spain.  
Trikke Tech was founded by three young 
Brazilians, who had invented a small three-wheel 
human-propelled vehicle. Though the launch in 
Brazil was unsuccessful, they believed in the 
potential of the product. One of the founders, 
Guido Beleski, moved to California, carrying a 
prototype, patented the product in the USA, and 
opened a new firm. He accidentally met a scooter 
industry executive, who bought a stake in the 
company. This partner brought marketing and 
distribution skills and a business network. The 
product was launched in the US market in 2002. 
Beleski and his American partner were in charge 
of the US operation (marketing and sales), while 
the other two partners carried out R&D in Brazil. 
Production was later outsourced to China, after a 
spontaneous contact from a Chinese scooter 
manufacturer. The company had local 
distributors in 44 countries. 
Firm S (disguised name), a semiconductors 
company, was established in 1998 in Shanghai, 
China, by four graduate students. In 2002, a 
Singaporean venture capitalist invested in the 
firm. In 2003, a Shanghai government’s initiative 
gave the leading entrepreneur the opportunity to 
visit science parks in France. This led to the 
creation, in 2003, of a joint venture with a French 
partner, which enabled the firm to integrate R&D 
with marketing capabilities in different regions. 
Shortly thereafter, Firm S acquired a Russian 
company (with R&D and marketing activities), 
to be closer to the Asia-Pacific region, and 
established an R&D center in Taiwan to learn 
about the business system in the Taiwanese high-
tech industry. The firm underwent a fast 
expansion after 2004, opening subsidiaries in 
Canada, South Korea, and Japan. 
Trial, a software development firm, was 
founded in Finland in 2000, “with the intention 
of creating an international firm instead of a firm 
that goes abroad country after country” 
(Kuivalainen & Saarenketo 2012:275). The 
company initially opened a sales office in 
Sweden, but later closed it. Operations moved to 
the US and the UK, and later it was 
headquartered in the US (from Finland). By 
2006, Trial’s activities spread across three 
countries: headquarters in the USA; R&D in 
Finland; and other value chain activities in the 
US and the UK. Out of its 130-people staff, 100 
were American and British, and 10 were Finnish; 
the CEO was a US-born executive, and just one 
member of the management team (out of seven) 
was Finnish. The rationale for the reorientation 
towards the USA and the UK was the importance 
of these markets to the company. 
4 Discussion 
These cases show that the ‘why’ and the 
‘how’ of the location of value chain activities 
follow patterns different from those assumed by 
traditional BGs literature. There is often a 
process of experimentation, by trial-and-error, in 
which the entrepreneurial team has to redefine 
company’s location and activities patterns in 
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response to perceived restrictions and/or 
opportunities for firm growth.  
As to the ‘why’, the case analysis indicates 
that is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’. Various motives 
are behind the decision to set up a borderless 
firm, and its value chain configuration is the 
result of the interaction of different factors. 
RacingThePlanet is at one extreme: the location 
decision was planned and the business model 
was, to a large extent, designed from the outset. 
But this approach does not hold for the other 
cases. “In fact, different reasons—rational, 
idiosyncratic, or serendipitous—may be present, 
which can be similar to the more general 
motivations that drive FDI decisions, or other 
internationalisation decisions” (da Rocha and 
others, 2017:138). As interactions take place and 
new linkages are envisaged as useful tools to 
respond to challenges or to explore opportunities, 
new partners are taken onboard, and new asset 
and location configurations are subject to 
experimentation. The explanation for most 
moves was to a large extent piecemeal, 
satisficing (Simon, 1956), instead of being 
guided by optimization criteria. As da Rocha and 
others (2017:138) put it: “in a sense, the question 
seems to be not ‘why’ one establishes an activity 
in a given country, but rather ‘why not?’”. Value 
chain configurations change according to an 
effectual logic (Sarasvathy, 2008). 
This leads to the ‘how’ question. Networking 
plays a key role in explaining how a borderless 
configuration emerges and develops. In a way 
similar to Galkina and Chetty (2015), da Rocha 
and others (2017:139) found that “effectual 
networking together with the planned use of 
network resources in other countries and world 
regions” strongly shaped the very process of 
internationalization. This finding was confirmed 
by Simões and Martins (2017), who suggest that 
effectuation is likely to play a more significant 
role in borderless firms than in traditional BGs. 
Nonetheless, decisions based on both 
effectuation and design logics may go together. 
While RacingThePlanet has followed an ex ante 
design, the process may often develop in ways 
that could not have been anticipated, as shown in 
the Leblon Cachaça, Trikke Tech and Firm S 
cases.  
The research by da Rocha and others (2017) 
has another relevant implication: it shows that 
the use of planning and effectuation logics in 
firm internationalization is not restricted to 
foreign market entry and sales thereinafter. To 
fully understand the borderless firms’ 
international value chain configuration, the full 
portfolio of activities of the firm needs to be 
analysed.  
For this reason, it is important to distinguish 
between traditional (downstream) BGs and 
borderless firms. While the former usually 
internationalise from a home base, and the 
process may be understood by just taking a 
downstream approach, the latter demand close 
examination of their inception period. Most 
often, the international value chain configuration 
is the result of an early combination of intended 
and emergent processes, based on an open 
approach to worldwide activity location. This 
cannot be understood when an exclusive 
downstream approach is taken. There is a need to 
distinguish between these two types of INVs, and 
to understand borderless as a promising and 
expanding breed, which requires further specific 
research. The recent work by Simões and Martins 
(2017) follows this path, and suggests that 
comparisons between borderless and traditional 
BGs should be further developed. 
5 Conclusion 
This article intends to underline the 
differences between borderless firms and 
traditional BGs. Drawing from recent criticisms 
to BG approaches and from research on 
borderless companies, namely da Rocha and 
others (2017), we have shown that borderless are 
in fact different from traditional BGs insofar as 
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they have an internationally dispersed 
configuration of value chain activities, a feature 
that is not necessary to characterise a BG firm. 
While planning and effectuation logics may (co-
)exist in both types of firms, available evidence 
suggests that borderless firms may be more prone 
to an effectuation logic, as they are more open to 
search for, or to react quickly to, opportunities 
that stem from mobilizing different location-
bound resources into a (temporary) international 
configuration. 
This paper has implications for both 
entrepreneurs and academics. For the former, it 
shows that there are different types of 
configurations, and that, contrary to 
Kuemmerle’s (2005) assertion, single home-
country approaches may not necessarily be the 
most successful. It also indicates that, in line with 
Sarasvathy (2008), experimentation is often an 
essential ingredient to international 
entrepreneurship, and that effectuation is a 
feasible way to develop networks and to mobilise 
international resources. For researchers, it 
highlights the interest of carrying out further 
research on borderless firms, since these seem to 
be increasing in number and present features that 
distinguish them from traditional BGs. The 
development of platform companies (Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) further 
underlines the need for research on international 
value chain configuration and approaches. 
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